One of the commando’s who accompanied the bodies home on the RAAF Hercules is the son of one of my army mates – he is just 24 years of age and has just completed his third tour of duty in Afghanistan. He has trekked Kokoda twice with us over the past couple of years – those who were fortunate enough to share the experience with him will agree you will never meet a finer young Australian.  He was in the helicopter behind the one that went down on that fateful night.  It was their last operation against the Taliban  - they were three minues from their home base – and only three weks from their loved ones back home.  It was incredibly traumatic for those in the second helicopter who tried their best to save their mates as they are such a close knit professional team.  Next time you hear some chicken-heart bleating about our troops in Afghanistan you might refer them to Sam’s letter below:

Dear Reader,The 10 days which followed have changed my life. They have afforded me the opportunity to become acquainted with the most exemplary group of people one could meet. The group I refer to is the 2nd Commando Unit of Australia’s Army to which the three fallen soldiers belonged.

On the 21st June 2010 a helicopter went down in Afghanistan and Australia lost three of its finest young people. One of those I am proud to have been able to call a friend. He also happened to be the son of good friends. Quite simply he was the finest young person I have known.

On the 21st June 2010 a helicopter went down in Afghanistan and Australia lost three of its finest young people. One of those I am proud to have been able to call a friend. He also happened to be the son of good friends. Quite simply he was the finest young person I have known.

On Saturday 26th June my children and I attended the ramp ceremony where the bodies of the soldiers were returned to their families. Accompanying the bodies on the plane back from Afghanistan were the remaining members of the unit, brought home earlier than scheduled.

The dignity and solemnity of this occasion triggered emotion in all who attended but the overriding feeling in the aircraft hanger on that day can be summed up by just one word – “respect”.

At the end of proceedings I met and talked with a number of the commandos of that unit. The common thread of those talks is that Afghanistan is where they all want to be assigned. It is where they can put their training into use. It is a cause they believe in. It is where they think they can make a difference.

On Thursday 1st July I attended the funeral of that fine young man in his hometown. Over 1000 people were present, including immediate family and friends, military chiefs, political heads of our nation, and many people with whom his loss resonated.

However this was truly a ceremony about the “commando family”, made up of the commandos and their direct family.   It was the commandos who provided the guard of honour; it was they who carried their fallen mate’s casket; and it was they who grieved deeply.

The strength and support shown by these same men to the bereaved family has been astonishing and something difficult for those outside this unique group to comprehend. It was this commando family that had people flown in immediately to offer emotional support and to take care of every detail of the funeral. They did this because they too had been to Afghanistan. They understood; they cared; and they had respect for the sacrifice involved. Equally the young man’s family has accepted its loss with dignity and courage in the knowledge that their son’s death had meaning and purpose.

So who are these people called commandos? They are young Australians from all walks of life and from varying ethnic backgrounds. They are dedicated, confident, highly trained and highly disciplined people who take enormous pride in their role as elite soldiers. When not on overseas postings they work in Australia on counter terrorism activities to keep our country safe. They also train constantly to ensure their skills are up to speed at all times.

In combat their body armour, rifle, ammunition and water weigh in at 35 kilograms yet on top of that they carry their backpack. Carrying more than their actual body weight, they jump out of planes. They endure privations that most could not envision.

Amongst the commandos I had the pleasure to meet was a 34 year old father of two whose back is so worn out that he will have no choice but to resign at year’s end. Another is recovering from serious injury and at a mere 29 years of age realises he also will have to leave. Yet another is walking around with grenade fragments in the back of his head as a result of an accident on the range. The first medic to the scene of his accident was the young man whose funeral he had attended earlier that day.

The inspiration for me to pen these words is not so much the commandos themselves for I know they seek no recognition. It is rather the fact that it is illegal for them to be photographed or even identified in the media as a commando. That is, while they are alive. Out of the 16 Australian soldiers lost in Afghanistan, 12 have been commandos.

Everyday Australians therefore have no idea who these people are. These people who die for us; who suffer life-long disabilities for us; who protect us from sinister influences within our very own borders.

In an age when we idolise so-called celebrities – TV performers, sports people, actors – I pose the question “where have we gone wrong?”

On a personal level it is this commando family that has inspired me to strive to do better, to put in more effort for those in need in our society, and to focus less on material wants.
On a national level is it not time we started to redress the unhealthy pastime of idolising those who are simply working at what they enjoy and who happen to feature on our television screens or in the media?

Is it not time for more of our young people to work harder in pursuit of their own goals and to pay more respect to the teachers and elders who endeavour to help them?

Is it not time for families to work harder at developing a work ethic for themselves and their children in order to make a better contribution to our country?

Is it not time for older Australians to work harder for those less fortunate and for all Australians to show more respect to each other regardless of their heritage?

I have met my heroes. They will hereafter be my inspiration. But I can’t tell you who they are.Sam Halvorsen 67 Grandview Drive, Coolum Beach QLD. Tel. 07 5471 6644

On 16 September 1950, a small crowd assembled in the sunroom of the west wing of the Repatriation General Hospital at Heidelberg in Melbourne. The group consisted of official military representatives, wartime associates and personal guests of the central figure, who was wheelchair bound – Thomas Albert Blamey. Those present were concerned that Blamey’s ill health would not allow him to endure the ceremony that was about to follow. Although the governor-general, Sir William McKell, and the prime minister, Robert Menzies, were late in arriving from the airport to present Blamey with the baton of a field marshal of the British Army, Blamey’s strength held out and he was able to accept the baton from the governor-general. This minor but historic ceremony recognised Blamey’s service to Australia and he remains Australia’s highest ranking soldier.

Despite the recognition of Blamey by the Australian Government, his reputation has suffered in recent years. Accompanying the increased interest in the Kokoda campaign in Australia, numerous books and articles have been published on the subject. In otherwise balanced histories, Blamey has come under scathing criticism. On the other hand, the performance of other key participants has received little or no scrutiny. At the time of the withdrawal of the Australian troops along the Kokoda Trail[1] in New Guinea[2], the senior commanders were Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell (1st Australian Corps), Major-General Arthur Allen (7^th Division) and Brigadier Arnold Potts (Maroubra Force, 21^st Brigade). All three officers were relieved of their commands, but under different circumstances.

High Command in Australia in 1942

In September 1938, Blamey was appointed chairman of the Commonwealth’s Manpower Committee and controller-general of recruiting on the recommendation of Frederick Shedden, secretary of the Department of Defence, and with the assent of Prime Minister Joseph Lyons. Menzies, who had become prime minister after the death of Lyons, then appointed Blamey as the Army’s national commander. Blamey was promoted to lieutenant-general in October 1939. His selection caused discontent among aspiring militia and regular senior officers. The decision was based on the government’s view that Blamey would resolve the inherent political-military issues that would arise in operating with the British better than any other officer (Dennis et al. 2008, 91). This was shown clearly when he resisted pressure from his British superior officers to disperse elements of the Australian force to meet their perceived needs; and he insisted that the battle weary 9^th Division be rested after their fighting at Tobruk, which was opposed by the British. 

Following the outbreak of war in the Pacific, Blamey returned to Australia from the Middle East. Despite having few supporters in the governing Labor Party, Prime Minister John Curtin appointed him Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces, in March 1942. Curtin knew that there was no other senior officer who could match Blamey in the position (Maitland 2005, 14). For months after the Japanese entered World War II, the Australian government clung to the view that its defence needs would be met by Great Britain and the United States. When the government decided to return troops from the Middle East to defend Australia, Curtin’s disagreement with the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, over the issue, led some observers to think that Curtin was headed for another breakdown in health (Day 2003, 287). The reputation of Curtin as a great wartime prime minister hinged on his insistence that 6^th and 7^th Divisions return to Australia. However, when the United States moved General Douglas MacArthur to Australia in March 1942 to become the Commander-in-Chief, South-West Pacific Area, he was given operational control of Australia’s armed forces and control of the media. This directly undermined Australia’s national interest and sovereignty. The Australian government was only too aware of this important issue from its experience in the Great War and when Blamey deployed to the Middle Eat in 1940, he was given a charter setting out his responsibilities to the government as well as to its allies. Also, Curtin set up the War Conference comprising himself, MacArthur and Shedden. Despite being the Australian government’s principal wartime advisor, Blamey was excluded from these discussions. In consequence, he had to take a strong stand with Curtin to get direct access to the prime minister. In fact, Curtin had made it plain to MacArthur that if high level war policy needed to be discussed in his absence, Shedden had his full confidence. Blamey should be used on an ‘as needed’ basis (Gallaway 2000, 74). And what background did Shedden have to place him in a position above all the service chiefs in matters of war policy in Curtin’s mind? Shedden had spent six months in the Great War as a lieutenant in the pay corps and later he had attended the Imperial Defence College. This was a government displaying the hallmarks of inexperience and lacking a measured response to the Japanese threat. It made Blamey’s work even more difficult.

The lack of proficiency of the Australian government was mirrored in the behaviour of Australia’s senior officers. Many writers have concentrated on the schism between officers of the militia and officers of the staff corps as the basis for disagreement. But this is far too simplistic. In the “generals’ plot” of  March 1942 for example, the officers who approached the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, to change the Army’s senior leadership, were a mixture of militia and staff corps. Differences between senior officers caused by personality traits and varying social backgrounds had already emerged in the campaigns fought in the Middle East (e.g. Braga 2004, 91). These officers were motivated by pursuing their own advancement and showed no reluctance in maligning their fellow officers, whether militia or staff corps. Rivalries between senior officers led some observers to comment on whether their main efforts were being directed at the enemy or in quarrelling with one another (Maitland 2005, 12).

Despite growing knowledge in Australia of the debacle of the campaign in the Philippines, MacArthur and his staff managed to ensure that Curtin and Shedden remained in “contented ignorance” of these matters (Gallaway 2000, 76). The whole MacArthur legend was accepted without question. When MacArthur was given operational command of Australian armed forces and responsibility for Australia’s strategic direction, he was expected to place Australian officers on his Allied Headquarters. Even though the United States president and MacArthur’s superior officer, General Marshall, expected this course of action, MacArthur excluded Australians by saying that there were no suitable senior officers available (Thompson 2008,  289). All eleven senior positions on the headquarters were filled by United States officers, eight of whom came with MacArthur from the Philippines. The ‘Bataan gang’, as they became known, controlled the war, but remained in profound ignorance of the conditions the Australian soldiers faced in New Guinea. MacArthur’s overriding concern was in his rivalry with the United States Navy in waging the war against the Japanese in the Pacific. Through his control of the media, MacArthur ensured that Blamey and the Australian forces received little credit for their fighting in New Guinea and in the islands further north. The Japanese landings on the north coast of New Guinea in July 1942 and their subsequent advance south along the Kokoda Trail placed the Australian government in a state of panic.

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Lieutenant-General S. F. Rowell

One of Curtin’s Ministers, John Beasley, told cabinet colleagues that if Port Moresby was to fall, Blamey should be there and fall with it (Carlyon 1980, 104). Curtin was a troubled man. During a meeting with him on 17 September 1942, MacArthur expressed the view that Blamey should go to New Guinea to ‘energise the situation’. Curtin did not question MacArthur’s advice and told Blamey of his decision. Blamey reminded Curtin that he had recently visited New Guinea and that Rowell had the situation under control. Further, it was not possible for him to carry out his wide span of responsibilities in Australia from Port Moresby. Curtin’s decision did not change and on 22 September 1942 he telephoned Blamey to tell him that he should not remain in Brisbane for another day (Day 2003, 395).

Awaiting Blamey at Port Moresby’s Seven-Mile airfield was his corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell. Two days prior to his arrival in New Guinea, Blamey sent a letter to Rowell by safe hand, explaining the reasons for his return so soon after his previous visit. There was no need for Blamey to write such a conciliatory letter to a subordinate, but he was aware that Rowell carried an underlying antipathy towards him from their service together in the Middle East and Blamey wanted to avoid any unnecessary friction on his arrival (Carlyon 1980, 105). Rowell thought that Blamey’s presence in New Guinea showed a lack of confidence in him and he resented the fact that it coincided with the halting of the Japanese on the Kokoda Trail. He believed this would mean that he would lose the recognition that was due to him in turning back the Japanese (Edgar 1999, 187). Another point of contention for Rowell was the fact that Blamey had not brought his own headquarters to New Guinea with him. Blamey had not done so because his headquarters was better placed in Australia to attend to its strategic and other responsibilities and to move it would impact on the limited logistic support between Australia and New Guinea. In any case, this was the commander’s decision to make and Rowell knew this. Why Rowell could not maintain a professional military relationship with Blamey is not altogether clear. After all, under Blamey’s leadership, Rowell had been promoted from lieutenant-colonel in October 1939 to lieutenant-general in April 1942. When Blamey explained to Rowell that he had been ordered back to New Guinea by Curtin following the Australian withdrawal from Ioribaiwa ridge, Rowell argued that he still should not have come. This was despite admitting that he did not understand the political situation in Australia. There is no evidence to suggest that in Rowell’s long military career he had refused a direct order from a person with the standing of a prime minister, but Rowell had made up his own mind not to tolerate the presence of Blamey prior to his arrival (McDonald 2004, 351). Following a heated meeting on Blamey’s first night in New Guinea, Rowell declared to one of his staff that if Blamey was a real man he would have ‘…sacked me on the spot’ (McDonald 2004, 352). Blamey asked a senior officer who had accompanied him to Port Moresby, Major-General Samuel Burston, to counsel Rowell to help resolve the situation. Both men knew each other well, but this was to no avail. Rowell further exacerbated the situation by denying Blamey access to situation reports compiled from information from forward commanders (Carlyon 1980, 108). In a military structure, there can only be one result from such insubordination and Rowell admitted as much in a letter to Blamey the following year (Hetherington 1973, 256). On the morning of 28 September 1942 after further heated discussions, Rowell was relieved of his command by Blamey. Rowell’s temperament played a significant part in his downfall (Dennis et al. 2008, 455) and it was noted that he was in a depressed state prior to his dismissal (McDonald 2004, 352). Edgar (1999, 206-210), who examined the psychological state of senior officers in the Kokoda campaign, might well have included Rowell on his list.

Brigadier A. W. Potts

A Gallipoli veteran, Brigadier Arnold Potts took command of Maroubra Force at Alola on 24 August 1942. Concurrently, he was concentrating his 21^st Brigade to provide relief for Maroubra Force. Along the Kokoda Trail, he was responsible for a series of desperate delaying actions against the advancing Japanese. Potts, who shared the extremely arduous conditions on the Trail with his soldiers, was held in great esteem by them. He was noted for his energy and mental strength. Growing pressure mounted on Potts to take offensive action against the Japanese. In particular, it originated from MacArthur in Australia who, with faulty intelligence on the strength of the Japanese and with no understanding of the conditions under which the fighting occurred, believed that the Australian soldiers were not prepared to fight. Following the withdrawal from Eora Creek and Templeton’s Crossing, Potts was expected to make every effort to hold the logistic base, Lake Myola. Potts was unable to do this and withdrew to a high ridge to the south of Efogi. There, for the first time, Potts was able to assemble his complete brigade, even though two of his battalions were under-strength from the incessant fighting. Both of his superior officers, Allen and Rowell, were concerned at the loss of Myola and the lack of offensive action. However, if MacArthur and Blamey in Australia were not aware of the struggle facing Potts, neither were Rowell or Allen. This was because no liaison officer had been deployed forward of divisional headquarters (Braga 2004, 197), which was a serious flaw in the command structure (Horner 1978, 152). In lieu of trained liaison officers, Rowell had used war correspondents, but they were not equipped for the task.

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The ensuing battle at Efogi/Brigade Hill was fought from 7-9 September 1942. Following probing patrols, the Japanese attacked in force from Efogi and simultaneously made a flanking incursion from the west close to the rear of the Australian position, which isolated brigade headquarters. Many examples of selfless bravery by the Australians were evidenced in this battle. 2/27^th Battalion took the full force of the initial Japanese assault, provided a strong rearguard action to allow the rest of the Australians to withdraw, and made a tortuous journey for two weeks to safety, carrying their wounded. The depleted 2/14^th and 2/16^th Battalions came under sustained attack and their courage in fighting the Japanese incursion to their rear allowed the brigade headquarters to break from the battle and withdraw to Menari.

Without any analysis of the conduct of operations, Ham (2004, 230) concluded that Potts’ tactics on the withdrawal to Brigade Hill were ‘… a brilliant defensive manoeuvre’. And later, in describing Potts’ chosen defensive position, Ham (2004, 234) was of the opinion that the steepness and forest of the western slope of Brigade Hill made it ‘… a natural barrier to which any commander might feel comfortable turning his back’. Brune (2004, 200-201), again without military analysis, claimed that Potts had covered almost every contingency. These assertions cannot be sustained. Potts sited three independent battalion positions, plus a separate brigade headquarters. This had the potential to compromise the security of his line communications as his radio back-up was unreliable. He lost control of the battle almost from the outset when the Japanese incursion cut his telephone lines (Edgar 1999, 167). Further damage was done to 2/27^th Battalion communications by Japanese mortar fire. On the afternoon of 6 September 1942, Potts moved the 2/27^th Battalion position about 800 yards up the ridge from its initial position. After further adjustment by the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Cooper, the battalion was located about 300 yards above the old mission hut. The position was on very steep ground with poor visibility. Following the move, the soldiers had little time to dig in with no tools apart from ‘bayonets, tin hats and fingers’ (Paull 1958, p.193). Therefore, the defensive position was very vulnerable to enemy fire, particularly indirect fire. In light of these shortcomings, the resistance of 2/27^th Battalion to the Japanese attacks on 8 September 1942 was outstanding.

On the night of 7 September 1942, approximately 90 Japanese using local guides scaled the ridge from the west carrying a Juki machine gun. This was a standard Japanese tactic to bypass the main force and cut off their withdrawal route. The feat of the Japanese should be acknowledged, but the western approach is no steeper than many other parts along the Trail. The Japanese incursion was not detected by any patrols or sentries and the Japanese established a dominant position by first light on the Trail between the brigade headquarters and the rear battalions. In fact, Potts was fortunate not to lose his own life to a sniper’s bullet. Ham (2004, p. 237) excused Potts for this oversight, considering it was understandable that ‘… it never occurred to Potts that an attack could come from this direction’. With the loss of control by Potts (which included command of the brigade mortars), there was always going to be the problem of timing an orderly withdrawal. The alternate withdrawal route to Menari, that was identified by Captain Herbert Kienzle[3] and reconnoitred by 2/14^th Battalion, was inadequate. It passed to the east of the established Japanese position on the Trail, but was poorly defined, causing difficulty for night movement. This hampered the withdrawal of 2/27^th Battalion, which had rearguard responsibilities as well as transport of the wounded (Sublet 2000, 79)[4]. Understandably, 2/27^th Battalion was slowed down considerably in its withdrawal and was not able to return to the Trail to defend it. The battalion was missing-in-action for nearly two weeks. Subsequently, Ham (2004, 238) acknowledged that Potts’ fighting withdrawal had become a rout and quite reasonably Potts’ fitness for command was reviewed by his superior commanders.

            A report sent back from Menari with the first liaison officer (Captain Geoffrey Lyon) to reach the 21^st Brigade, said in part that Brigade Hill could be held for only two to four days as there was no water on the position and supplies were short. Upon request from Major-General Allen, Potts confirmed the report, leaving Rowell and Allen alarmed at the situation. They believed that Potts’ judgement was affected by the strain of the campaign (Edgar 1999, 171). Potts was relieved of his command on 10 September 1942 and reported back to Allen and then Rowell on 11 September 1942. Rowell was not pleased with the lack of progress in halting the Japanese or in the content of some of Potts’ communications (Edgar 1999, 176).  On 23 September, Rowell returned Potts to command of 21^st Brigade, which had by then withdrawn to Itiki, as he believed that Potts had gained from his experience on the Trail (Paull 1958, 256). With their strong personalities, Blamey and Potts inevitably argued at Sogeri, exacerbating the situation. Their difference in rank could lead to only one result. On 22 October 1942, Blamey informed Potts that he was posted to Darwin and that Brigadier Ivan Dougherty[5] would replace him. Potts had a dislike for authority (Edgar 1999, 270), an example of which was a discourteous discussion he had with the Minister for the Army on one of his visits (Edgar 1999, 242).

Major-General A. S.  (“Tubby”) Allen

Major General Arthur Allen was also a veteran of the Great War and had the singular distinction of commanding at each level from platoon commander to divisional commander on active service. In June 1941, he took command of 7^th Division, which was sent to New Guinea in August 1942. The withdrawal of 21^st Brigade back along the Kokoda Trail has been discussed above. It was not until the battle at Brigade Hill that Allen sent a liaison officer forward to report on the fighting conditions. This was a significant omission by Allen who was not able to understand fully the difficulties Potts faced. Nor was he able to move forward himself as he was also responsible for the defence of Port Moresby (Braga 2004, 200). His responsibility for Port Moresby was removed on 9 September 1942 and subsequently he was able to move his headquarters to the Kokoda Trail at the village of Uberi. On 16 September 1942, Allen agreed to his brigade commander’s (Brigadier Kenneth Eather[6]) request to withdraw from Ioribaiwa to Imita Ridge to form a firm base from which to advance. The withdrawal created panic and uncertainty in Australia, which resulted in Blamey’s arrival in New Guinea under orders from Curtin. After Rowell’s termination as corps commander, Allen made it clear to Blamey his interest and experience for the position (Braga 2004, 219), but Blamey selected Lieutenant General Edmund Herring[7] as the replacement. This decision had more to do with the eventual dismissal of Allen than any direct intervention by Blamey. Allen had long standing differences with Herring dating back at least to their previous service together in Palestine in 1941. Their personalities and social background had little in common. Prior to his arrival in New Guinea, Herring formed the opinion that he wanted a new leadership team when he took command. He favoured Dougherty to become Commander, 21^st Brigade (which had now eventuated), and he wanted Major-General George Vasey[8] as one of his divisional commanders (Braga 2004, 236-237). As Allen’s division advanced north along the Kokoda Trail, a poisonous relationship developed between his headquarters and Herring’s headquarters. Herring rarely communicated with Allen. This was left to Blamey. Herring interpreted Allen’s signals as indicating excessive caution and lack of offensive intent (Braga 2004, 241). Blamey had previously asked Allen to tell him if he needed relief, as Blamey became concerned about Allen’s fitness for continued command (Braga 2004, 230-231).

Pressure from MacArthur on the Australian high command persisted as he was concerned about what he saw as unnecessarily slow progress in driving the Japanese back to the north coast. This became difficult because the Japanese had established two major delaying positions, at Templeton’s Crossing and at Eora Creek. MacArthur was of the view that the lack of casualties in the Australian advance showed an unwillingness to engage the enemy. MacArthur’s words were passed on directly to Allen by Blamey, which infuriated Allen. MacArthur placed more pressure on Blamey and, on the night of the 26 October 1942, Blamey and Herring agreed to relieve Allen of his command. Vasey flew to Myola on 28 October 1942 and Allen took the return flight on 29 October 1942. When Vasey’s health became an issue in December 1942, Blamey considered replacing him with Allen, but Herring disagreed.            The precarious situation of supply support that had hampered Allen during the advance was evidenced when 25^th Brigade reached Kokoda with their rations expended (Braga 2004, 256).

In November 1944, Blamey recommended Allen for a knighthood in recognition of his service to Australia, but this was not granted by the Labor Government even though Blamey raised it again prior to his retirement. Rowell’s opinion of Allen diminished during the 1950s. He accepted the more general opinion of Allen, that he was a good brigade commander, but he had been promoted one level above his competence (Braga 2004, 298).  

Assessment

When Blamey was ordered to take command in New Guinea by Curtin, the prime minister had no idea of the ramifications of his ill-considered decision (Paull 1958, 248). As well, he had placed MacArthur in a position of power that undermined Australia’s sovereignty and placed Blamey in an invidious situation. Curtin failed in his responsibility to the Australian people by divesting control of its military affairs to MacArthur (Braga 2004, 209). Each of the dismissals – of Rowell, Potts and Allen – was under very different circumstances. It is common practice today to find these dismissals bundled together and Blamey portrayed as the unreasonable perpetrator of them all. The resentment created by Blamey’s intemperate address to 21^st Brigade at Koitaki and later to the brigade’s officers on 9 November 1942 (Carlyon 1980, 110-111), endured well after World War II[9]. It galvanised opposition against Blamey, which resulted in the concerted denigration of his time in New Guinea. Journalist Raymond Paull, author of the first comprehensive review of the Kokoda campaign (Paull 1958), could hardly be described as taking an independent view of Blamey’s decisions. As a soldier in Darwin he was in Potts’ brigade and he largely accepted Rowell’s account of events, giving prime acknowledgement to the input of Rowell, Allen and Potts in researching his book. Even the foreword to the book was written by Rowell![10] In 1974, Rowell published his autobiography, which not surprisingly placed himself in the best possible position (Rowell 1974). He did not even acknowledge his role in the dismissal of Potts. He had pleaded loyalty to Blamey (Hetherington 1973, 256) after he returned to Australia, but on many occasions his actions and words were undeniably the opposite. The events described by Paull and Rowell have largely gone unchallenged. 

On the other hand, Blamey did not write an account of his wartime experiences. This was in line with his indifference to public opinion. Blamey eschewed contact with the press, which was a serious shortcoming[11]. He could not understand why a man holding public office could not quarantine his private life and when, as chief commissioner of police in Victoria, he was advised of the difficulties that this attitude could bring upon himself, he did not change (Hetherington 1973, 64). As commander-in-chief, he was plagued by misunderstandings that could have been easily resolved if he had cared about his public image and explained himself (Carlyon 1980, 155). Nevertheless, Blamey made an outstanding contribution to Australia during World War II and he had no peer. As well, he was the only Allied commander to retain his command from the outset to the finish of the Second World War.

Nothing in the preceding paragraphs diminishes the exceptional valour and endurance, under extremely adverse conditions, of the Australian soldiers on the Kokoda Trail in 1942.  

References

Braga, S. (2004). Kokoda commander: a life of Major-General “Tubby” Allen (Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, Vic).

Brune, P. (2004). A bastard of a place: the Australians in Papua, Kokoda, Milne Bay, Gona, Buna, and Sanananda (2^nd edition) (Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, NSW).

Carlyon, N. D. (1980). I remember Blamey (Macmillan: South Melbourne, Vic).

Day, D. (2003). The politics of war (HarperCollins: Pymble, NSW).

Dennis, P., Grey, J., Morris, E., and Prior, R. (eds.) (2008). The Oxford companion to Australian military history (2^nd edition) (Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, Vic).

Edgar, W. (1999). Warrior of Kokoda: a biography of Brigadier Arnold Potts (Allen & Unwin: St. Leonards, NSW).

Gallaway, J. (2000). The odd couple: Blamey and MacArthur at war (University of Queensland Press: St. Lucia, Qld).

Ham, P. (2004). Kokoda (HarperCollins: Pymble, NSW).

Hetherington, J. (1973). Blamey controversial soldier: a biography of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, GBE, KCB, CMG, DSO, ED (Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra).

Horner, D. M. (1978). Crisis of command: Australian generalship and the Japanese threat, 1941 – 1943 (Australian National University Press: Canberra).

Maitland, G. L. (2005). Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey: Australia’s most promoted, but least appreciated soldier. United Service 56 (2, September), 10 – 17.

McDonald, N. (2004). Chester Wilmot reports: broadcasts that shaped World War II (ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Sydney).

Paull, R. (1958). Retreat from Kokoda (Heinemann: Melbourne).

Rowell, S. F. (1974). Full circle (Melbourne University Press: Carlton, Vic).

Sublet, F. (2000). Kokoda to the sea: a history of the 1942 campaign in Papua (Slouch Hat Publications: McCrae, Vic).

Thompson, P. (2008). Pacific fury: how Australia and her allies defeated the Japanese scourge (William Heinemann Australia: North Sydney, NSW).

Captions for maps

Map 1: The Kokoda Trail in 1942.

Map 2: The Japanese attack on the 21^st Brigade position at Efogi,7-8 September 1942.

 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowan Tracey served in the Australian Regular Army for over 20 years.  During this time he was seconded to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force to manage procurement for two years.  He travelled widely in the country and organiseed a crossing of the Kokoda Trail as a training exercise for his defence agency in 1984.  At this time very few Australians ventured on the Trail and because of the lack of use, navigation was a serious challenge.  In recent years, his continued interest in Papua New Guinea and the history of the Kokoda campaign has resulted in him leading groups for Adventure Kokoda.  His presentations at sites like Brigade Hill have resulted in a close evaluation of the accepted history of the Kokoda campaign. Of associated interest to him are the severe limitations that administrative and logistic support placed on the commanders of both armies. Lieutenant Colonel Tracey is a Trek Leader with Adventure Kokoda

[2] This term is used throughout the essay to describe both the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea which came under military authority on 14 February 1942 when the civil administration was suspended.

[3] Captain Kienzle, a plantation owner from the Yodda valley, was serving in the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, formed on 10 April 1942. He had the onerous responsibility for establishing and maintaining the lines of supply to the Australian troops fighting on the Kokoda Trail. For his wartime service, he was made a member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE).

[4] Local carriers were held back at Menari as they were not permitted in the combat area.

[5] Brigadier Dougherty proved to be an able commanding officer in the Middle East and, on return to Australia in March 1942, he was promoted to command 23^rd Brigade. In October 1942, he took command of 21^st Brigade in New Guinea.

[6] Brigadier Eather commanded 25^th Brigade which replaced 21^st Brigade at Iorabaiwa ridge.

[7] General Herring was an artillery officer who won the Distinguished Service Order and Military Cross in the Great War. Prior to his posting to New Guinea, he commanded Northern Territory Force.

[8] General Vasey, a Great War veteran, commanded 19^th Brigade in its hard fighting in Greece and Crete in 1941. He commanded 6th Division before his posting as Commander, 7^th Division.

[9] It is worth noting that the brigade commander, Brigadier Dougherty, who was present at Koitaki, was of the opinion that Blamey’s address was misconstrued – see Hetherington 1973, 263; and Maitland 2005, 17.

[10] Following World War II, Rowell reached the highest position in the Australian Army (chief of the general staff) from which he retired at the end of 1954.

[11] Blamey’s position could not have been more opposite to the approach of the ‘theatrically’-inclined MacArthur, who was a master of handling the press and had complete control of the Australian media.

While Australia’s Westminster system introduced civilised law and justice concepts to Papua New Guinea in colonial times it has not eradicated the spirit of ‘payback’ enshrined in their cultures over centuries. Payback within family, clan and village groups remains a binding custom in PNG society to this day.

The spirit of payback, like many other cultural traditions in PNG is not understood by most Australians. The relationship between our two countries has drifted over the years since independence. Up till that time young Australian patrol officers (kiaps) lived and worked throughout the country as administrators, explorers, teachers, health workers and policemen. Many married local women, raised families and took out citizenship after independence.

Australia built a School of Pacific Administration to train PNG citizens in public service administration. Bright young students were identified for educational scholarships in Australia. Others were trained in our military academies and served side-by-side with Australian soldiers in the Pacific Islands Regiment. Some returned with Australian wives to raise families in PNG.

These programs drifted into obscurity after PNG gained independence in 1975. Our corporate knowledge of the complexities of the ‘Melanesian way’ remained with Australian administrators, businessmen, miners and farmers who chose to remain in PNG. PNG’s corporate knowledge of our Western ways declined with the closure of the School of Pacific Administration and the decrease in the flow of students after they developed their own University of PNG.

Our relationship was later relegated to aid agencies which introduced PNG to an ideology of patronising dependence. The country has since been awash with highly-paid consultants who fly in and out without as much as a courtesy call to the relevant PNG Minister or Departmental Head. AusAID has approved and built projects without informing local MPs. PNG citizens, including former Australian citizens, are treated like lepers when they apply for a visa to visit Australia.

The ultimate snub was delivered when an overzealous security boofhead took their Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, aside at Brisbane airport and frisked him. We humiliated their Grand Chief! It was little wonder that some PNG MPs began to call for a ‘looking north’ policy. There is a strong feeling they would like us to take our aid and shove it. There is certainly no shortage of possible suitors. China, Japan and Malaysia have close ties and significant investment in PNG. Indonesia shares a common boundary. The Koreans are building a multi-million dollar casino in Port Moresby which will be restricted to ‘tourists and selected businessmen’. The PNG LNG project will double their GDP.

How they manage their new wealth and invest it for the future benefit of their people will be the major social challenge of their time. So far the signs are not good. The surge in expatriate demand for accommodation and services is making these less affordable for local citizens. Public officials from Moresby’s middle class are being forced into settlements to make ends meet. ‘Haves and have-nots’ have always been a part of modern PNG society but the gap is about to widen significantly and will inevitably lead to civil unrest if not managed properly.

In a critical review of the current Defence White Paper, Mr Neil James of the Australian Defence Association argued that Australia needs to ‘prepare for a looming demographic, political public health and law and order catastrophe in Papua New Guinea’. Maybe. But what if PNG asks China for help instead?

As academics and commentators rail on about endemic corruption and human rights abuses from their ivory towers in Australia PNG leaders withdraw further into their anti-Australian cocoons. Yet nothing seems to change despite the army of consultants and aid workers we send to PNG.

Perhaps it’s time we changed the directional flow of people between our two countries. Perhaps we should think of bringing more people from PNG to Australia to work on long term exchange programs in our public and private enterprises. Perhaps we should allow them to come here as seasonal workers. Perhaps we should establish a Ministry for Melanesia to focus on our relationship with our near neighbours who now number more than 10 million.

PNG’s rebuff to Australia during the asylum seeker debate last week was an indicator that we are no longer the white ‘masta’ and can no longer take them for granted. It might also have been a bit of payback for humiliating their Grand Chief at Brisbane airport. Either way they would have taken great delight in rubbing our noses in it.

This exploitation of local carriers would not have been allowed in 1942 and it should not be allowed today.

The PNG Kokoda Track Authority has established a Rangers Station at the start of the trail at Owers Corner but it seems to be all tiger and no teeth as evidenced by a Post Trek Report from one of our Adventure Kokoda trek leaders:

‘We departed Owers Corner the same time as (an Australian) Group of four trekkers and seven carriers.

‘I observed their packs being weighed- the heaviest being over 31kg and the lightest was 28kg.

‘On being told by the ranger that their packs were overweight the head guide informed the ranger that they were happy to carry the packs and that was the end of the matter.

‘On day 2 coming down Imita Ridge one of the (Australian group) carriers blew his knee out and could not continue. The trekkers were travelling well ahead of their carriers who could not keep up with them and consequentially there was no one to treat him. I examined his knee and he appeared to have knee ligament damage and also a torn muscle in his thigh. I left him at Va Ule creek but saw no way he could continue to trek with his pack weight’.

The overloading of local Kokoda porters is related to cost-cutting by rogue trek operators. These operators regard the PNG Kokoda Track Authority as a toothless tiger and they know they can flaunt their Code of Conduct and Licensing Agreement with impunity.

According to the KTA website www.kokodatrackauthority.org there are now 47 licensed trek operators on the Kokoda Trail. They are competing in a market that has declined by 54 per cent over the past year. The most effective way for rogue operators to cut costs is to cut the number of porters for their groups. Local porters are easily exploited in this regard as they there are now fewer opportunities to get work. That is why they advise the Rangers that they are happy to carry the extra weight.

Another major cost in conducting treks is the charter of an aircraft to drop food for the second half of a trek at Efogi village. Feedback indicates that only a couple of trek operators continue with this practice due to increasing charter costs.

If the KTA is genuine in protecting the physical welfare of local porters from exploitation by rogue operators they should address this problem without delay.

The solution is simple. Our experience is that it takes three PNG guides/group and personal carriers to support one Australian trekker. This is based on the following assumptions:

1. The trek operator will comply with the KTA Code of Conduct and limit the maximum weight to be carried by each Carrier to 20 kg.
2. The trek operator has organised a charter flight to deliver supplies for the last half of the trek to Efogi village.
3. Trekkers engage a Personal Carrier – the ratio can be reduced slightly for those trekkers who carry their own backpack.

If the trek operator cannot produce a receipt for a charter aircraft to deliver additional food to Efogi village at the half-way point then the ratio of porters to Australian trekkers in the group should be 5:1. All the Ranger has to do then is count the number of Australian trekkers in a group, count the number of PNG guides and carriers supporting them and multiply by 3  if they can produce a receipt for a charter aircraft, or 5 if they can’t.

This obviously means that rogue trek operators will have to charge more for their treks but it will also mean that more PNG guides and carriers will be employed and it will decrease the risk of physical injury caused by overweight backpacks.

Australian trekkers who do not wish to be party to the shameless exploitation of local PNG Guides and Carriers should ask two simple questions of the trek operator they choose:

1. Have they arranged a charter aircraft for a food resupply at the half-way point?
2. Do they have a ratio of three PNG guides/group and personal carriers for each Australian trekker – or five if there is no pre-arranged half-way drop?

Those who choose to trek with an operator who knowingly overloads their guides and carriers become partners in a shameless act of exploitation which is a poor reflection on the Kokoda spirit.

The reports raise a number of questions, in particular:

. Why has Nishimura waited until now to suddenly ‘remember’ the incident?

. How was Nishimura’s claim tested?

. Why wasn’t the ‘discovery’ reported to the appropriate authorities i.e. the Australian High Commission, the Army Unrecovered War Casualties Unit or the Office of Australian War Graves so that a specialist forensic team could be formed to excavate the site?

According to Australian army records, Captain Templeton was killed on 26 July 1942.

Corporal Kokichi Nishimura, according to Japanese army records and his own biography, did not arrive in the area where  Templeton was reported killed until 3 August 1942.  He made no mention of the incident in his recent biography, Bone Man of Kokoda.  He later makes conflicting claims – firstly that he buried Templeton’s body and later that he actually killed Templeton.  He does not explain the gap in time between Templeton’s reported death on 26 July 1942 and his arrival in the area eight days later.

On Wetherall’s Kokoda Spirit blog on 24 January 2010 he wrote :

‘’One Japanese soldier, Kokichi Nishimura (The Bone Man of Kokoda now aged 90) told me recently that Captain Templeton was executed.  He had been one of the officers ordered to bury his body and he drew me a map of the burial site’

‘My quest to unravel the mystery of what happened to Captain Templeton has involved a great deal of research, luck, fate and assistance from numerous sources in Australia, Japan and Papua New Guinea.  I have been aided with entries from the 39th Battalion War Diaries for this period, translated diaries of some of the Japanese veterans that were there, and interviews with veterans from Australia, Japan and PNG’.

Whilst he did not provide any documented references to support his claim the announcement led to nationwide publicity in Australia and a feature story in the Weekend National newspaper in Papua New Guinea.

The proper process for reporting any new information regarding veterans listed as killed or missing in action is to inform the Australian High Commission, the Army Unrecovered War Casualties Unit and  Department of Veterans Affairs (Office of Australian War Graves) in Canberra.  If the report is considered to be genuine they would establish a specialist team comprising a forensic anthropologist, an archaeologist, and forensic odontologists to excavate the grave to recover and identify any remains found as they have recently done in Papua New Guinea.

Such a profound announcement in reference to the discovery of Captain Templeton’s body should have been supported by documented research rather than a glib statement advising that the search  ‘involved a great deal of research, luck, fate and assistance from numerous sources in Australia, Japan and Papua New Guinea.’  In view of the national newsworthiness of the story, the fact that Camptain Templeton’s loss had already been the subject of two official army investigations, and the likely distress such an announcment would have on surviving members of  Templeton’s family, Wetherall should be called upon to provide any additional research he has to support his claim.

The recovery of human remains from a general area designated on a sketch map drawn 67 years after the incident is a highly specialised forensic operation.  Wetherall should have been aware of this if he has conducted the amount of research he claims to have done.  The fact that he released pictures to AAP  of his family and associates at the alleged gravesite in t-shirts with his company name emblazoned on them would indicate that it was more of a promotional exercise than a proper search for Captain Templeton’s remains.  The AAP pictures were posted at: http://www.aapimage.com.au/Search.aspx?Search=%22SAM+TEMPLETON+REMAINS+PNG%22&Field=ObjectName&gallery=SAM+TEMPLETON+REMAINS+PNG

Following are factors which are publicly available and which should have been thoroughly investigated by Wetherall prior to any public announcement:

. The Japanese 17th Army was established for operations in the South Pacific Area on 18 May 1942. Included in its Order of Battle was the South Seas Force (Rabaul) which included the 144th Infantry Regiment comprising the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions .

. The Commander of the South Seas Force received orders on 1 July to land in the Buna area and quickly advance to the saddle of the Owen Stanley Range to the south of Kokoda and evaluate the roads for an offensive against Port Moresby. The Yokoyama Advance Force was established under Colonel Yokoyama Yosuke to evaluate the condition of roads which included the ‘Buna to Kokoda Road’ and the ‘Road from Kokoda through to Port Moresby ’.

. According to Charles Happell, author of Bone Man of Kokoda, Corporal Kokichi Nishimura was a grenade launcher with the 4th Squad of the 3rd Platoon of the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment .

. The 1st Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment was detached to the Yokoyama Advance Force . The force landed at Gona with little enemy resistance on 22 July and began constructing a base. The forward sections of the Yokoyama Advance Party (one Infantry Company with motor vehicles) moved quickly towards Kokoda as soon as it landed. The main strength of the party proceeded to Buna during the morning of 22 July. It became clear after the landing that there had been a platoon of Australian observer troops at Buna and a smaller party at Gona, but they had withdrawn prior to the landing .

. The forward party proceeded quickly from Giriwa, Soputa, and Sonbo along the Kokoda road. At Awala on 23 July, the unit defeated approximately thirty native troops and then one hundred Australian troops. The unit then advanced to the high ground at Oivi approximately 16 kilometres to the east of Kokoda, where they were joined by the main strength of the advance party on 26 July .

. According to Australian reports on the Japanese action on 26 July 1942: (Lieutenant) McClean, eager for action, hurried forward to Oivi with those of his men who arrived in the first lift. He was with Templeton’s two platoons and the Papuans when the Japanese attacked at 3 p.m. The attackers were halted at first by the fire of the forward section, then outflanked it and forced it back to the main positions on the plateau on which Oivi stood. The defenders then went into a tight perimeter defence of diameter about 50 yards. The two opposing groups maintained a desultory fire during the afternoon, the Japanese sometimes pressing to within a few yards of the perimeter before they were killed. About 5 o’clock Templeton went to examine the rear defences and to warn the second half of McClean’s platoon, under Corporal Morrison, whom he thought to be about to arrive. There was a burst of fire from the gloomy forest. Templeton did not return .

. Dr Geoffrey Vernon recorded in his diary: ‘‘Once they (the Japanese) knew we were there, they started to send troops around onto our right flank and there was a machine-gunner there so I went back to company headquarters to report and said, ‘Where’s Captain Templeton’? They said ‘He’s gone for help’ and I said, ‘It’s not like Captain Templeton – where’s he gone?’ Within those few minutes I was talking, there was a shot, Captain Templeton? So I got two men, Harry Evans and Bill Luxmoore and my guide, Sanopa to come and see if we could help Captain Templeton, and a little over 200 yards from our position. Anyway, I put Harry and Bill on one side of the track and said don’t fire until I tell you and then the Japs had just come round the corner. I didn’t know how many there were. They were 200 or 300 yards from our position so I said, ‘Right fellas, back!’ By the time we’d come back, Nips had come down a spur overlooking our position. They were quick, and so many of them and so few of us that we didn’t know what to do. ’

. Raymond Paull (Retreat from Kokoda) reports: ‘Before the full weight of the attack developed, Templeton decided to go back along the track towards Kokoda with the object of bringing up the reinforcements. Ten minutes after his departure, Collyer heard the single, sharp crack of a rifle. Templeton did not return, not did a small patrol sent out to find him. A burst of machine-gun fire, falling suddenly around Collyer and Stent on the Kokoda side of the clearing, warned the Australians that the enemy had penetrated along the flank. The Japanese launched their attack in the late afternoon, but when it failed to dislodge the Australians, it subsided at dusk. Every man at Oivi felt Templeton’s loss keenly, for he was a courageous and efficient officer. They cursed their easy acquiescence in allowing him to go unescorted. The sole evidence of his fate discovered much later in the campaign suggests that the Japanese ambushed and captured Templeton, badly wounded him, and killed him to rid themselves of an unwanted encumbrance. ’

. By all reports Sam Templeton was a reserved and very introspective man. Like a number of other Australian commanders of the time, he went outside the defensive perimeter on his own which concerned his troops. We can only speculate as to why he did this but it could have been his way of ‘leading from the front’ to inspire his troops in the face of the imminent dangers of war, just as Lieutenant-Colonel Owen did in a different context a few days later when they fought the Japanese during the first battle for Kokoda.

. The Yokoyama Advance Force continued their advance and attacked a company of Australian defenders at Kokoda during the night of 28 July, and by the following morning had occupied Kokoda and the adjacent airstrip. The battle took the lives of a company commander, and twenty other troops. Australian prisoners of war captured at Kokoda set out the situation of the Australian forces at the time .

. Three days after the action that saw Captain Templeton killed or captured and the day after the Japanese occupied the Kokoda plateau: ‘Corporal Nishimura and his mates from the 5th Company were aboard the Kotoku-maru and came ashore at Basabua Beach on 29 July’.

. This is verified in the Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area – New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43: ‘Kotoku Maru left Rabaul on 27 July under the protection of Tatsuta, Yuzuki and No 32 Submarine Chaser. Disembarkation began at Basabua on the evening of 29 July under intense bombardment from Allied planes .

The native tradition about the fate of Templeton is also worthy of mention. The land holders at Templeton’s Crossing firmly believe that Templeton, although wounded, fought a rearguard and independent action against the Japanese back to Templeton’s Crossing where he was killed. According to them he was then buried at the cemetery at Templeton’s Crossing and his body (as an unidentified soldier) was later exhumed by War Graves and taken to Bomana. Even though there is little to support the veracity of these claims, it does show the diversity of opinion about Templeton’s fate.

Corporal Kokichi Nishimura

It is clear that Captain Sam Templeton was killed or captured on 26 July 1942 by the Japanese troops belonging to the Yokoyama Advance Force. If Captain Templeton had been captured it is highly probable he would have been interrogated by his captors and then passed back along the line to higher headquarters for further interrogation. It is clear from Japanese reports that they had little information of the route from Buna – Kokoda – Port Moresby. The chief of staff of 17th Army instructed the Yokoyama Advance Force to gather intelligence of the road to Kokoda and ‘the road from Kokoda through to Port Moresby ’.

If Captain Templeton had not been killed as reported on 26 July he would have been seen as a valuable source for both the conditions of the roads and tracks and the disposition and strengths of Australian forces in the area.

Corporal Nishimura’s statement that it was ‘he who buried Captain Templeton in a shallow grave in the jungle following his brutal summary execution soon after he was captured near the Kokoda Track’ is difficult to accept for the following reasons:

. Captain Templeton was killed or captured on 26 July.

. Corporal Nishimura did not land at Basabua with his 2nd Battalion until 29 July.

. According to Japanese war records Nishimura would not arrived in the area Templeton was reportedly killed unit 3 August 1942.

. According to Nishimua’sa own account immediately after landing  ‘they began marching west towards Kokoda village, at the head of the Track, encountering few obstacles and arriving there five days later. Here they waited for almost three weeks for the main force of the Nankai Shitai to arrive, while living off rations at camp headquarters’. Given that Oivi is only a few hours march from Kokoda it is reasonable to assume that Nishimura would have arrived in the area on 3 August – eight days after Captain Templeton was shot or captured. His battalion would have therefore joined the Yokoyama Advance Force troops around Kokoda on 3 August.

• According to a Port Moresby National Weekender cover story ‘Mr Nishimura told reporters in Port Moresby he buried Captain Templeton after an enraged Japanese officer killed the captured Australian. ‘It seems Captain Templeton got lost, being pushed back by Japanese soldiers’ he said through an interpreter. Mr Nishimura said Captain Templeton was taken for interrogation and the Japanese commander became enraged when the Australian said there were ’80,000 Australian troops waiting for the Japanese in Port Moresby’. ‘How many of you will see out the day?’ Captain Templeton asked mockingly. Mr Nishimura said that remark infuriated the Japanese even more. ‘The commander got angry at Templeton’s answers and he stabbed him’ he said.

• On 1 August, Commander Horii visited his Chief of Staff and stated that ‘previous prisoner-of-war interrogations had revealed that there were approximately twenty thousand Allied troops stationed at Port Moresby’ . It is possible that this information would have been obtained from Captain Templeton in the event that he had been captured as he was the only officer the Japanese had captured at this stage of their campaign.

• As a Corporal Grenade Launcher on a 90 km march between Buna and Kokoda amongst hundreds of Japanese troops, Corporal Nishimura would have been very low down the pecking order of importance. He would also have been exhausted as he ‘carried a ten-kilogram grenade launcher and ammunition instead of a rifle’ along a road that has no protection from the direct sun and tropical humidity. Nishimura does not explain how he was singled out to bury Captain Templeton after he had been executed.

• Lieutenant-Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi, a medical officer from the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment found Captain Sam Templeton ‘wounded and left on the ground’.

• In an interview for the television documentary, Beyond Kokoda, the late Colonel Hiroshi’s wife stated: ‘He (Templeton) was wounded in the jungle and was lying down on the ground. Seeing him, my husband thought “I am a soldier but also a doctor”. So he took him to his position and provided him with 1st Aid. My husband took care of his wounds and said “You will be OK now”. For the first time the Captain opened his mouth and said “My name is Templeton”.• Sergeant Nishimura Kokichi of the 144th Regiment, in and interview on the same documentary: “The Japanese questioned him about the number of Australian troops and locations of their positions. But the Captain didn’t answer. Instead he laughed at the Japanese saying ‘behind are 8,000 allied troops have gathered in our support. I wonder how many of you will actually get there alive. I will be counting’. The battalion commander got angry and stabbed him in the belly with a sabre.’• It is worthy of note that Sergeant Nishimura Kokichi does not make any mention of this incident in his biography, The Bone Man of Kokoda. 

• In a recent newspaper article titled the 90 year old Nishimura now ‘believed that he was the one who killed the captain almost 70 years ago, and buried him in a shallow grave making Captain Templeton possibly the first casualty in the battle of Oivi, which was one of the first skirmishes fought in the battle for Kokoda’.• In a recent book on the Japanese on the Kokoda Track the authors, Craig Collie and Hajime Marutani (a translator-interpreter and a researcher for the Australian War Memorial’s Australia-Japan Research Project), wrote:

 ‘Nishimura grew increasingly eccentric and fractious over the years. In his periodic returns to Japan he would stay with his daughter in Tokyo, but otherwise he slept in the back of his car when travelling around the country. While many of the relics he collected ended up with the (Kochi-New Guinea) association, Nishimura was suspended for breaking its rules, most flagrantly building a memorial at Efogi with association permission. He was still allowed to attend the annual Shinto ceremony as a private individual, which was all the unsociable Nishimura was interested in doing anyway. In later years he became friendly with Imanishi, who viewed him with a bemused tolerance he had been unable to muster for Moriki’.

The circumstances of Captain Templeton’s death have been a mystery since he was last seen on 26 July 1942. Because it was virtually the first action of the Kokoda campaign it has been mentioned in most accounts that have been published since the war. Corporal Nishimura made no mention of his involvement in the burial of Captain Templeton in his biography, The Bone Man of Kokoda by Charles Happell. It is a fair question to ask why he has waited until now to reveal the information.

So what did happen to Captain Sam Templeton?
(The following authentic research was conducted by Carl Johnson and revealed in his book, Mud Over Blood, published by History House in 2006)

‘Without doubt, one of the 39th Battalion’s most revered senior officers was Captain Samuel Victor Templeton. On joining the battalion at Darley as a lieutenant, Templeton was posted to B Company and later, after further promotion, became the Commanding Officer. He was, as were many of the original officers of the battalion, a veteran of the First War. He had served with the Royal Naval Reserve as a junior gunnery officer with the Adriatic Squadron during 1918-19. He had also been involved in the Irish Rebellion of 1917 and after the First war experienced action during the Spanish Civil War as a member of the International Brigade, a band of volunteers from all nationalities who had made their own passage to Spain to fight the Communists.

‘He gave his age when joining the Australian Army in 1940 as thirty-nine. This was common practice by those who were over-age for active service during the Second War. The age requirement for enlistment stipulated one had to be thirty-nine or under to gain entry – hence the term of the day, ‘thirty-nine liars’, as many veterans lied about their age to fulfil enlistment requirements. Sam was born on the 12th April 1900 in Belfast, Northern Ireland but immigrated to Australia in the 1920’s. He gained employment with the Victorian Railways, later leaving to become manager of Corns Pastrycooks. In 1931 he joined the 5th Battalion, the Victorian Scottish Regiment with whom he gained his commission on the 25th October 1939. On his enlistment he was a married man, with one son residing in East Brighton, a bayside suburb of Melbourne.

‘After training at Darley, Lieutenant Templeton sailed with the battalion on the ‘Aquitania’ where he volunteered to assist in instructing personnel in gunnery training. Here he drew from his experiences with the Royal Navy during the previous war to train crew to operate the ship’s defences. After arrival in Moresby he, along with his comrades suffered the daily grind of life in the tropics. Over the next months the battalion gradually lost many of their senior members as the realities of service in tropical conditions took its toll. Many were either sent to non-combatant units or sent back to Australia and designated B Class. Templeton was one of the few that remained. He gained his captaincy and was made Commanding Officer of B Company. Those interviewed that served under him speak highly of his professionalism and soldiering qualities. He was a strict disciplinarian, but fatherly to those under his command. By the time B Company had been chosen to be the first of the battalion to face the Japanese, he had gained total respect and loyalty from those under his command.

‘During the seven-day hike across the Owen Stanley’s, Captain Templeton was an inspiration to his men, who were mostly half his age. Some recalled how he would go up and down the line of men as they toiled under their equipment. He would encourage them as they went and helped those who were finding the going tough by carrying their rifles. Jack Wilkinson, who was amongst the first company to cross the mountains, noted the following in his diary: ‘7/7/42, Made Ioribaiwa. Had carriers for our packs and just as well. Felt the trip more than the first day. Two long hills to climb. Missed out on tea as I was with last of the troops. Had a job to get some of them to make it.. ‘Uncle Sam’ came back and helped me about half way up the last hill. Was carrying four rifles and three packs and had doubts about making in myself. ‘Uncle Sam’ insisted on carrying all my gear as well as that of others’. Another member of B Company recalled seeing Sam at one time during the trek with at least four rifles over his shoulders. It was thought by some under his command, that given the fact he was continually going from front to rear of the column to keep the men going, that he actually travelled double the distance as the rest of the company.

‘After arrival at Kokoda, Captain Templeton set off for Buna to make sure that the company’s stores and heavy equipment had arrived safely. Prior to their departure for Kokoda, and advance party had boarded the schooner ‘Gili Gili’ under the supervision of B Company’s quartermaster, Sergeant Allan Collyer. After his return to Kokoda, the sounds of battle could be heard coming from the north. The Japanese had started their invasion of New Guinea by accomplishing landings at Buna and further around the coast at Gona and Sanananda. Templeton sent forward 12 Platoon under Lieutenant Mortimer, 11 Platoon under Lieutenant Seekamp was to follow and 10 Platoon under Lieutenant Garland was ordered to remain at Kokoda to defend the small airstrip in order that reinforcements could be landed. Lieutenant Seekamp’s 11 Platoon had been posted to hold the village of Awala, whilst 12 Platoon was ordered to protect the track between Awala and Kokoda near the village of Goirari. The battalion’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Owen arrived by plane at Kokoda where Captain Templeton was waiting to meet him. After the CO’s arrival, both officers then headed off to join the two advanced platoons of B Company. Meanwhile these platoons had been engaged in rearguard actions, including a successful ambush, which Seekamp’s men had laid on the unsuspecting Japanese at Awala. By the time Templeton and Owen turned up, 11 Platoon had fallen back on the village of Goirari. The reinforcements had been requested and these were expected at any moment. Owen before leaving to return to Kokoda to meet these, ordered the advanced platoons of B Company to make a stand 800 yards east of Goirari. After dispersing his men, Owen left to meet the reinforcements.

‘After his departure, the ambush of advancing Japanese at Goirari was effected. However given the overwhelming force of the Japanese who were about to overwhelm the 39th’s positions, these two platoons had to be withdrawn to a new defensive position. The two platoons broke contact and fell back on the little village of Oivi, to await what was hoped to be at least one fresh company of the 39th to reinforce the depleted ranks of B Company. Instead of a company, the plane which arrived at Kokoda carried only half of one platoon of D Company – this was 16 Platoon under Lieutenant McClean. Owen quickly ordered these to go forward to join 11 and 12 Platoon, who were now holding onto their positions at Oivi. The Japanese made the first of their assaults on the 39’s men at Oivi in mid afternoon, just after Lieutenant McClean’s men had arrived and been dispersed. It was believed that the other half of 16 Platoon had already landed at Kokoda and it was with the aim of meeting up with these, that Captain Templeton left the defensive position at Oivi to guide in the rest of 16 Platoon under Sergeant Morrison. He left his second in command, Captain Stevenson, and Major Watson (the Commanding Officer of the P.I.B) to take control of the three platoons in his absence and set out alone to meet the rest of 16 Platoon which he believed as about to arrive.

‘It has been mentioned in several books that within moments of Captain Templeton leaving, ‘a burst of fire’ was heard from the direction he had gone and that was the last that was ever seen of him. However some believe that this burst of fire was instead a single shot probably fired by Templeton himself. Sergeant Martorana of 12 Platoon recalled that at the time it was heard, he had just approached Major Watson to ask where Templeton had gone. On being told that he had gone to bring in the rest of 16 Platoon he remarked, ‘that doesn’t sound like Sam’. At least two other members of B Company heard the single pistol shot and felt certain that Captain Templeton had walked straight into a group of Japanese along the track and that he must have fired on them. They did not hear any return rifle fire, and assumed he had been captured. A member of B Company who went out after Captain Templeton and followed him a short distance, was ordered by Templeton to return to the position, as he wanted no escort. Within moments of this man doing as ordered, he heard the single shot and then heard the Japanese calling out, ‘Corporal White’. Sergeant Martorana as soon as he heard the shot believed his captain was in trouble and asked their guide Sanopa, along with Private Evans and Luxmoore to come with him to see if they could find Captain Templeton. After getting near to the spot where the single shot had come from, Sanopa halted them saying that ‘he could smell them’. Within moments of the four dispersing to the side of the track they could see large groups of Japanese advancing towards them. Without hope of outgunning these, Sergeant Martorana ordered all to return to Oivi, This they did and made it safely back unmolested. Captain Templeton’s body was never located. The Japanese advanced en masse, and the defensive perimeter of the 39th which was threatened with being outflanked, was hastily withdrawn to fall back on the Kokoda Plantation where it engaged the Japanese in the first real battle of Kokoda.

‘Headquarters Southern Command received news of the disappearance and probable death of Captain Templeton and an official telegram was sent to his wife, Doris at East Brighton. His personal effects, which had been left at Kokoda prior to his last actions at Goirari and Oivi, followed later. For a time his army file was closed. The search for his body was officially abandoned and his official fate was amended to read, ‘Missing in Action 27th July 1942’ and for official purposes ‘Presumed Killed in Action’. During the later campaigns in the north of Papua some Japanese intelligence reports were captured which included references to the Yokoyama Advanced Force’s operations during the Yokoyama Advanced Force’s operations during August at Kokoda. One of these caused the fate of Captain Templeton to be re-examined and a new investigation to be started. When one of these captured reports was translated it read in part: ‘Yokoyama advanced groups entered battle with 39 Australian Battalion led by Captain Templeton. 2 Prisoners. One of them was Captain Templeton. 5 more Prisoners.’ Queensland L of C Area Records Office received this report in February 1943. As well, another Japanese Intelligence Report was entitled, ‘Enemy Terrain Situation’, and included details which had been taken during the interrogation of a captured Australian captain taking prisoner in the Kokoda area. This information included the number of Australians that confronted the Japanese advance, and in part read, ‘That a battalion of about 1000 men, commanded by a colonel had arrived in that area some 10 days before. In addition there were believed to be 500 to 600 Papua New Guinea troops with European officers along the Mambare River.

‘There is no doubt that the captured officer was Templeton and it is assume that after his capture, he endeavoured to bluff his captors into believing that the strength of the Australian force in the Kokoda area was vastly larger than it was. It was his last effort to delay the Japanese from totally overwhelming the 39th’s positions at Kokoda. He had give them a totally false estimate, which was some ten times the amount that there really was. By doing so, if forced the Japanese to re evaluate their position and gave his comrades some time to regroup and be reinforced. This was a brave move on his behalf. It had been assumed that after his capture, the Japanese dispensed with him, after gathering all the useful information his captors felt they would obtain. There are certainly several instances when the Japanese executed their prisoners soon after interrogation. However there was possibly one more sighting his shortly after this period. When some members of the 39th Battalion Association returned to New Guinea in 1967 for one of their first pilgrimages to the former battleground, a local villager who had lived in the area during the campaign of 1942 approached one of its members. The villager spoke of an Australian captain who was a prisoner and was in a cage on his own at Oro Bay on the coast. It was presumed that the captive was waiting to be transported to Rabaul, as other captured officers from the New Guinea area had been taken there in 1942.

‘There are no captured Japanese documents to prove or disprove this, but it must be remembered that captured officers were of great interest to Japanese Intelligence. It is unlikely that an officer would be so quickly done away with, if there were any chance of securing more information that would assist the Japanese later. It would be more likely that the first interrogation which he was submitted to, was to gather information about the immediate area and the Australians that confronted them, and that he was possible taken back for transportation to Rabaul for more thorough interrogation after this.

‘However, he definitely did not survive captivity and his official date of death is still unknown. Army Records kept his file open and marked it, ‘Missing in Action and Believed Prisoner of War’ until July 1945, when it was amended to read, ‘Believed Deceased on or after the 27th July 1942’. Captain Templeton faced his captivity as he commanded his company – with great resilience and by placing the welfare of his men and fellow officers before his own. He assisted the rest of his comrades by slowing down the Japanese, by making them more cautious of what lay ahead of them at Kokoda and may have saved many lives. Had the Japanese advanced swiftly and with the knowledge that only a mere hundred or more Australians were before them, then the two thousand or more Japanese would have had a swift victory.

‘What of the other prisoners whom the Japanese had claimed to have captured? The soldier reported captured at the time Captain Templeton was taken prisoner, was more than likely Private Sydney Moffatt, who disappeared the previous night. He had been sent out as a runner from the advanced platoons, to report back to Kokoda during the action at Goirari and no trace was ever found of him. For the other five, of whom all are undoubtedly B Company men, there are two explanations. After Templeton went missing it is said a small patrol was sent out to locate him. These as well were never seen again, although this group may be confused with Sergeant Martorana’s small group who went out after him and were forced back. The second theory is that when the beleaguered platoons at Oivi extracted themselves to regroup at Kokoda, it could be that some did not get the message to break contact. This was a belief that Sergeant Martorana held, interviewed some sixty years after the battle. The order to withdraw had been passed around from man to man, but he believed that a few may not have received the message and so were left behind in the confusion.

‘Examination of the battalion’s nominal roll reveals that eight of B Company were missing, believed dead, and have no known graves. At least two of these, (Privates Holness and Priestly) can be discounted as one was last seen badly wounded, and the other is believed to have been blown clear over the escarpment at Kokoda when his weapon pit received a direct hit. What is known is that the Japanese made no mention of them by name, and having already captured a senior officer, would have had little use for private soldiers who fell into their hands. An advancing army, fighting in such a terrain, has little resources for prisoners. It must be presumed therefore that these members of B Company were put to death soon after capture, maybe in sight of Captain Templeton in an attempt to extract information from him. We cannot tell exactly how these men died, but we do know that they all lived to the high ideals of their country, and died in its defence with staunch courage.’

Conclusion

Corporal Nishimura’s claims in regard to Captain Sam Templeton’s fate are spurious in view of the facts contained in official Australian and Japanese war documents. The investigations conducted by the Australian Army soon after the Kokoda campaign remains valid and will continue to be so until evidence to the contrary is presented to the Army Unrecovered War Casualties Unit for further investigation.

If Wayne Wetherall of Kokoda Spirit has additional information to that contained in the two official army investigations he should provide it to the appropriate authorities without delay. 

We will obviously publish any new information that has been validated by the relevant authorities in regard to the circumstances surrounding the capture/execution of  Captain Sam Templeton – but until that time the official investigations conducted by the army should stand and the matter should be left to rest.

References:

. Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43. Steven Bullard. Australian War Memorial 2007.

. The Bone Man of Kokoda. Charles Happell.MacMillan.

. Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43. Steven Bullard. Australian War Memorial 2007

. Australia in the War of 1939-1945, South-West Pacific Area First Year, Kokoda to Wau, Dudley McCarthy. Australian War Memorial

. From the diary of Dr Geoffrey Vernon, Medical Officer attached to Bn HQ. Mud over Blood. Carl Johnson

. Retreat from Kokoda – The Australian Campaign in New Guinea 1942. Raymond Paull. William Heinemann Australia

. Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43. Steven Bullard. Australian War Memorial 2007.

. The National Weekender, Port Moresby, 5 February 2010.  Ilya Gridneff, AAP Papua New Guinea Correspondent. Cover Story

. The Bone Man of Kokoda. Charles Happell.MacMillan

. The National Weekender, Port Moresby, 5 February 2010.  Ilya Gridneff, AAP Papua New Guinea Correspondent. Cover Story

. Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43. Steven Bullard. Australian War Memorial 2007

. The Path of Infinite Sorrow – The Japanese on the Kokoda Track. Craig Collie and Hajime Marutani. Allen and Unwin.2009

. Beyond Kokoda, History Channel

. Sunshine Coast Daily article, ‘News Makers’ 21 February 2010

The proclamation was the result of a proposal submitted by Charlie Lynn of Adventure Kokoda.  Charlie made the following speech to the NSW Parliament on 2 May 2006:

KOKODA COMMEMORATION DAY

The Hon. CHARLIE LYNN [6.50 p.m.]: Last week, on the occasion of my forty-first crossing of the Kokoda Track in Papua New Guinea, I was privileged to present the Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, with a strategic plan for the proclamation of the Kokoda Trail as a national memorial park. The objective of the plan is to develop a sustainable eco-trekking industry for the Koiari and Orokaiva people who live along it. These people are custodians of land sacred to our Australian heritage and they will protect and care for the various battle sites if we provide them with an incentive to do so.

The plan came about when the former Minister for Veterans Affairs, Bruce Scott, advised me that the Government had no master plan for the development of the Kokoda Track. His successor, Danna Vale, advised me that if I were to devise such a plan she would present it to the Government for implementation. We then established a Kokoda Track Foundation, which raised the finances to complete the plan. We worked in partnership with the Worldwide Fund for Nature, the University of Technology, Sydney and Templeton Galt.

We engaged Colonel David Knaggs to facilitate the process. That involved workshops in Sydney, Efogi Village, Kokoda Village and Port Moresby, and included Koiari and Orokavia clan leaders and landowners, local, provincial and national government bodies, and other stakeholders such as the RSL, Rotary, the Kokoda Track Authority and the Papua New Guinea National Cultural Commission. Sir Michael was generous in his response to the plan and we hope to work in partnership with his Government in its implementation. We intend to present the plan to the current Minister for Veterans Affairs, the Hon. Bruce Billson, in Canberra on 15 June.

Kokoda, like Gallipoli, has had a slow awakening. While the story of Anzac was well known to all Australians as a result of our annual commemoration of Anzac Day, it was not until Peter Weir’s epic film Gallipoli around 30 years ago that the peninsular developed into a pilgrimage for young Australians. This led to an increasing interest in other Australian battles on the Western Front, where our Anzacs, under the inspiring and visionary leadership of General Sir John Monash—arguably the greatest Australian of all time—were instrumental in the defeat of Germany. So it is with Kokoda.

Recent documentaries and books on the Kokoda campaign have led to an awakening of the importance of the battles along the track during the period from 8 August to 16 November 1942. This interest is also evident in the increasing number of Australians trekking across the track. Last month some 600 Australians aged between 10 and 70 trekked across it. The impact of the experience on those who trekked it is profound. They feel betrayed that they were never taught anything about it; They feel ashamed that we have ignored our Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels by never issuing them with a medal, and are disappointed at the neglect of significant battle sites.

Notwithstanding these disappointments, they feel proud that they have walked in the footsteps of the brave and have conquered some of their own adversities along the way. They also feel proud that they have shared the experience with their fellow Australians and have re-established a strong relationship with our PNG cousins. There is no doubt that Kokoda is stirring the emotions of our current generation just as Gallipoli did to a previous generation.

Therefore I believe we should take the next step and consider the proclamation of a Kokoda Day of Commemoration on our national calendar. It should not be a holiday but a day when services are held in our schools and communities. I believe 3 November should be proclaimed as Kokoda Day. I acknowledge that the Kokoda campaign began with the first contact between 39 Militia Battalion and the Japanese forces forward of Kokoda on 24 July 1942 and ended with the crossing of the Kumusi River in pursuit of the retreating Japanese on 16 November 1942.

The battle across the track began with the Japanese attack on the Kokoda Plateau on 27 July 1942 and ended when the Australians re-entered Kokoda on 2 November and raised the Australian flag in the village on 3 November. I believe that the raising of the flag symbolised our victory against all the odds, a victory attributed to the success of our naval forces in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and our airforce in its continual bombing sorties against Rabaul and Japanese naval and amphibious forces. Kokoda is symbolic of all these victories.

In 2002 I supported a proposal for a Battle of Australia Day and argued that Kokoda was too narrowly focused. Since then I have completed many more crossings of the track and have had access to much more research material, which has caused me to change the view I expressed at that time. Kokoda is the only time in our history where Australian territory was invaded by a fanatical and powerful enemy force. Our diggers were outnumbered, outgunned and out-trained but they contested every inch of the track back to the last line of defence, where they rallied and forced the invading Japanese forces back, and re-entered the village of Kokoda on 2 November. No Kiwis, British or Yanks were involved—it was purely an Australian operation.

Kokoda is symbolic of the fighting qualities evident among our soldiers, sailors, airmen and servicewomen in all of our campaigns in the south-west Pacific area. The anniversary of the raising of the Australian flag at Kokoda on 3 November 1942 would, I believe, be the most appropriate day to commemorate Kokoda Day. Therefore I call on the Federal Government to proclaim 3 November as Kokoda Day and include it as a national day of commemoration.

Charlie Lynn then submitted the following proposal for Kokoda Day to be proclaimed to the Prime Minister of PNG, The Rt Hon., The Grand Chief, Sir Michael Somare:

Executive Summary

Australia was unprepared for the war in the Pacific in 1942. Our faith in ‘great and powerful friends’ coming to our aid in the event of Japan entering the war was shattered with the sinking of HMAS Prince of Wales and HMAS Repulse near Singapore on 10 December 1941 and the secret deal struck by UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Roosevelt for American aid to be directed to the European theatre of operations at the expense of the South West Pacific.

The defence of Australia and its mandated territory of New Guinea was dependent on untrained militia forces and a small band of New Guinea Rifles as our experienced AIF units were returning from Europe to meet the new threat.

Resources were so scarce in New Guinea that young males were forcibly recruited to support the war effort. Many of these men from remote mountain villagers had no idea of the war and were conscripted against their will. They were told that men from Japan were the enemy. For many of these men other villagers living in remote tribal lands were also considered ‘enemy’. One can only imagine the fear and uncertainty they felt as they were forcibly marched away from their families and clans.

They were designated as Carriers but were to become known as ‘fuzzy-wuzzy angels’ because of their selfless sacrifice in assisting wounded and sick diggers during the various campaigns.

They carried vital war supplies on their bare shoulders in endless lines over hostile and inhospitable terrain. Modern day trekkers are in awe of their efforts. Without this vital link in the chain of our war effort Japan would have been successful in the conquest of New Guinea.

Today, 67 years after the Pacific War, they are the only link in the chain not to have received any official recognition. Many claim they were not properly paid. None were ever issued with a medal. No day has been set aside to commemorate their service or sacrifice.

It is difficult to understand why successive Australian governments have ignored this important omission.

The recent upsurge in interest in the Kokoda campaign by Australian trekkers indicates there is a strong desire for our wartime links with Papua New Guinea to be recognised. This can be achieved by providing them with an incentive to visit, or revisit the country.

The proclamation of a ‘Kokoda Day’ dedicated to the wartime carriers would provide this incentive.

This paper recommends that November 3rd be officially proclaimed as a day of commemoration for the carriers. This is the day the Australian flag was raised at Kokoda – a ceremony that would never have been possible without the support of the New Guinea Wartime Carriers.

Objective

To seek the support of the National Government of Papua New Guinea to proclaim 3rd November as ‘Kokoda Day’ to commemorate the service of the wartime carriers.

Background

The PNG Carriers who supported Australian troops during the Pacific have never been properly recognized. Some were never paid and none ever received a medal for their service.

According to our official history of the war in the Pacific by Dudley McCarthy (Australia in the War 1939-1945, p116) the Australian New Guinea Army Unit (ANGAU) was authorised by the Australian government to provide for:

‘the conscription of whatever native labour might be required by the Services..’

Rates of pay were to be determined and the Senior Military Officer or District Officer was empowered:

‘to have the natives so employed to enter into a contract with the Australian Government.’

It has been estimated that some 10,000 PNG nationals served as Carriers in support of the Australians during the Kokoda campaign in 1942.

A further 42,000 are estimated to have been indentured to support Australian troops in the Milne Bay and the Buna/Gona campaigns. They were paid 10 shillings per month.

According to wartime journalist, Osmar White :

‘ANGAU contrived a maximum mobilization and use of native labour. At the critical period, its method of conscription was even more arbitrary than German recruiting in the early days. In some villages every able-bodied male over the approximate age of sixteen years was rounded up, transported to the clearing centres, and thence drafted to whatever type of work had priority in the immediate emergency. Brutal disciplinary measures had often to be taken in the field; but when the first and worst crises of invasion were surmounted, ANGAU did what ti could to conserve the life and health of its native levies and to maintain the viability of native communities depleted of 40 or 50 per cent of their able-bodied men. Under military rule, the labourers’ health was more carefully considered and their diet in general better than under private employers before the war. ANGAU was fully aware of the value of native labour and co-operation to the Allied effort.

What is not understood by many is that male villagers indentured for work as Carriers faced two potential enemies – the invading Japanese and traditional clans whose customary land was foreign to them.

During the period 1944 to 1957 approximately 2 million pounds was paid by the Australian Government in compensation for property damage to PNG nationals by the Australian Government. In 1975 PNG gained independence and the PNG Government assumed all legal obligations for compensation of its veteran community.

Unfortunately the PNG Carriers were excluded from benefits under legislation for compensation of PNG nationals who served in the Defence Force. In 1980 they were also deemed to be ineligible for the PNG War Gratuity Scheme for ex-Servicemen.

In 1981 the Australian Government paid $3.25 million to the PNG Government under the Defence (PNG) Retirement Act as a final payment for compensation for Carriers. In 1986 the PNG Government introduced payments of PNGK1,000 for each surviving Carrier. The payments ceased in 1989 and many Carriers claim to have not received any money.

During the 50th anniversary of the Kokoda campaign the issue of payment and compensation for many of the Carriers who claim they were never paid was raised with the Keating Government.

On 21 April 1992 The Australian newspaper reported that returned servicemen in PNG had called on the Australian Government to pay hundreds of local war veterans who helped Australian troops during the Kokoda campaign. According to the report:

“The President of the PNG Returned Services League, Mr Wally Lussick, said Australia had sent about $3.5 million to PNG to help compensate local war veterans in the early 1980s, but much of the money had gone to the wrong people and a large group of carriers missed out.

“Mr Lussick said much of the money went to those press-ganged into being carriers for the Japanese and many people who took no part in the war received payments.

“The visit to PNG later this week by the Prime Minister, Mr Keating, for Anzac Day services to mark the 50th anniversary of the Kokoda battles would provide a good opportunity for Australia to make a commitment to the surviving carriers, he said.”

In the PNG Post-Courier of 24 April 1992, the Prime Minister of PNG, Sir Rabbie Namaliu called on Australia ‘to help compensate WW2 carriers and stretcher bearers”. He raised the issue with Prime Minister Paul Keating at the time. According to the Post-Courier:

“Most of the carriers and ex-servicemen received compensation payments from Australia in the mid-1980s, but many legitimate veterans from the Southern Kokoda Trail near Port Moresby, missed out.

“PNG authorities estimate up to 200 surviving carriers are still waiting for some kind of payment from Australia for their wartime labour and service.

“Mr Namaliu said the Government was considering making an approach to Australia to identify and pay those carriers who have gone unrewarded for half a century.”

On 5 May 1992 the Bulletin with Newsweek reported:

“Keating says compensation cases will be dealt with on their merits and all worthy claims examined; but no concrete sum for individuals has been discussed. The difficulty of maintaining a list of the original carriers is underlined by how few speak English. Family members of dead carriers are calling for posthumous compensation – after all, they took part in a battle that Keating described this week “as more important to Australians than any other battlefield in Europe or Africa.”

Whilst Prime Minister Keating was genuine in his desire to resolve the issue it is clear that his bureaucracy put it in the ‘too hard basket’ at the time.

The argument that ‘it would be inappropriate for the Australian Government to consider taking any further action on this matter in the absence of a detailed proposal from the Papua New Guinea Government’ was a cop-out.

The increasing numbers of Australians trekking Kokoda and reconnecting with the ‘sons of the fuzzy-wuzzy angels’ will be enthusiastic supporters of a day dedicated to their memory.

Kokoda Awakening

Kokoda is experiencing a slow awakening as evidenced by the following numbers of Australians now trekking across the track:

1. 2001: 76
2. 2002: 365
3. 2003: 1074
4. 2004: 1584
5. 2005: 2374
6. 2006: 3750
7. 2007: 5146
8. 2008: 5621

Amongst the trekkers in the above figures have been Federal and State politicians, prominent media personalities, successful business people and a number of private schools.

Remembrance Day – Papua New Guinea

Remembrance Day commemorates Papua New Guinean servicemen who sacrificed their lives in World War 11 and Bougainville. It occurs on 23 July which commemorates the day in 1942 when the Papuan Infantry Battalion first fought against Japanese soldiers near the Kumusi River in Oro Province. Remembrance Day is a public holiday.
In 2008 Governor-General Paulias Matane paid tribute to these soldiers and added:
“Also we must remember those who provided intelligence reports, coastwatchers and the fuzzy wuzzy angels. All these fallen heroes contributed in a significant way to the strategic defence of our land then and today.”

Kokoda Day

Whilst Remembrance Day commemorates the service of Papua New Guinean servicemen who served, and those who sacrificed their lives in action during the Pacific War and the Bougainville crisis, Kokoda Day would be dedicated to the service of the Wartime Carriers.
Kokoda Day would not be a national holiday. It would be a day of commemoration which could include:

• a morning service in schools (thus providing an opportunity to educate Papua New Guinean students on the achievements and sacrifices of their grandfathers);
• a flag raising re-enactment at Kokoda; and
• a service at Remembrance Park in Port Moresby.

Why 3 November?

The Kokoda campaign began with a full scale attack on the Australian 39th Militia Battalion on 29 July 1942. The campaign lasted three months as the Australians were pushed back to last line of defence on Imita Ridge. The Australians rallied at this point and pushed the Japanese back across the track. Kokoda was recaptured on 2nd November 1942 and the Australian flag was raised at a service the following day.

The flag raising ceremony symbolised the turning of the tide in the Pacific War. It also symbolises the service and sacrifice made by Carriers in all campaigns throughout PNG.

This victory would not have been possible without the vital support of the PNG Carriers across the track. In addition to their contribution to the war effort hundreds of Australian soldiers owe their lives to the selfless sacrifice of the Carriers who guided and carried them to safety over inhospitable jungle terrain in the most adverse of circumstances.

Tourism Benefits for Kokoda (Oro Province)

The proclamation of Kokoda Day would provide an incentive for Australians to travel to Papua New Guinea for the commemoration services.

Following is a monthly summary of Australians trekking Kokoda in 2007:

1. January: 4
2. February: 10
3. March: 57
4. April: 909
5. May: 254
6. June: 658
7. July: 959
8. August: 938
9. September: 735
10. October: 494
11. November: 78
12. December: 50

The proclamation would effectively extend the trekking season into November by providing an incentive for Australians to visit PNG. There are many Australians who are not physically able to trek Kokoda however they would visit the village if there was a strong reason for them to do so.

Commemorative activities would not be limited to a single day in Kokoda. It could include short treks up to the Isurava Memorial, across to Abuari and down the Eastern side of the range which was defended by the 53rd Militia Battalion. It would also provide them with an opportunity to extend their stay and visit the beachheads at Buna and Gona thus bringing increased tourism benefits to this region.

In addition to the re-enactment of the raising of the flag Kokoda Day would provide an opportunity for local clans to showcase their Orokaiva culture with sing-sings, traditional dances, markets and craft displays.

In Port Moresby a service could be held at Remembrane Park in the morning and a beating of the retreat at Bomana War Cemetery in the evening.

Diggers Tributes to PNG Wartime Carriers

In a report on the medical aspects of the fighting withdrawal in the face of overwhelming Japanese forces after the Battle for Isurava was lost, Colonel Kingsley Norris, Assistant Director Medical Services with the 7th Division praised the work of the Australian medics. No living casualty, claimed Norris, was abandoned to the enemy and overall 750 wounded and sick were shepherded down the track to safety. Norris was also full of praise for the ‘walking wounded’. They had, in Norris’ words, to be treated with ‘absolute ruthlessness’ and not provided with stretchers:

‘Those alone who were quite unable to struggle or stagger along were carried. There was practically never a complaint nor any resentment … One casualty with a two inch gap in a fractured patella, splintered by a banana leaf, walked for six days …’

Captain ‘Blue Steward, Regimental Officer, 2/16th Battalion:

“… they never forgot their patients, carrying them as gently as they could, avoiding the jolts and jars of the many ups and downs. The last stretcher was carried out by the Regimental Aid Post boys, two volunteers, Padre Fred and myself. Till then we never knew the effort needed, nor fully appreciated the work the carriers were doing. Their bare, splayed feet gave them a better grip than our cleated boots could claim on the slippery rocks and mud.

“Some of the bearers disliked the tight, flat canvas surfaces of the regulation army stretchers, off which a man might slide or be tipped. They felt safer with the deeper beds of their own bush made stretchers – two blankets doubled round two long poles cut from the jungle. Each time we watched them hoist the stretchers from the ground to their shoulders for another stint, we saw their strong leg, arm and back muscles rippling under their glossy black skins. Manly and dignified, they felt proud of their responsibility to the wounded, and rarely faltered. When they laid their charges down for the night they sought level ground on which to build a rough shelter of light poses and leaves. With four men each side of a stretcher, they took it in turns to sleep and to watch, giving each wounded man whatever food, drink or comfort there might be.

Laurie Howson, 39th Battalion:

“The days go on. You are trying to survive, shirt torn, arse out of your pants, whiskers a mile long, hungry and a continuous line of stretchers with wounded carried by ‘Fuzzy-Wuzzies’ doing a marvellous job. Some days you carry your boots because there’s no skin on your feet. But when I look around at some of the others – hell! They look crook! Then I have seen the time when you dig a number of holes in the ground and bury your dead. Nothing would be said, but you think ‘maybe it will be my turn next.”

Conclusion

The Australian army would have been defeated in the Kokoda campaign if they had not received vital logistic support from the New Guinea Wartime Carriers. Hundreds would have died of their wounds and tropical illnesses if they had not been carried off the track.

These wartime Carriers have never been officially recognised. The Australian government specifically excluded them from benefits under legislation for compensation of PNG nationals who served in the Defence Force. In 1980 they were also deemed to be ineligible for the PNG War Gratuity Scheme for ex-Servicemen.

The service of the wartime carriers and the sacrifices they made towards the allied victories in Papua New Guinea should be honoured and enshrined in a special day dedicated to their memory.

The most appropriate day is November 3 as the Australian flag would never have been raised on the Kokoda plateau if it had not been for their service.

Recommendation

‘Kokoda Day’ be proclaimed on 3rd November each year to commemorate the service and sacrifice of the New Guinea Wartime Carriers.

Major Charlie Lynn MLC

’A day walk took us to Naduri village and an audience with Ovoru Ndike (spelt wrongly), who at 104 years old is reputed to be one of the last surviving Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels – the men who carried supplies and wounded soldiers during the war.

’He is arranged on a wheelchair by his son Andy, who delivers an unimpressive speech that costs 10 kina a person for the privilege of deciphering. A 50-strong party from the Hawthorn AFL club later that day would have swelled the coffers’.

Adventure Kokoda donated the wheelchair that has been used by Ovoru for the past few years. It would be interesting to know what this bloke left behind! Less than 100 trekkers crossed Kokoda in December. Not all of them go through Naduri. If everybody paid K10 for a photograph Ovoru would have earned a maximum of K750 (around $350)  for himself and his extended family- this would have to last them until April when the trekking season recommences after the wet season. Some of this money goes to his church and most of the rest goes to pay school fees for his grandchildren in Port Moresby.  Nevertheless it would average out to about K40 (or $20 per week) which is a small price for a one-trek wonder to pay for his memento of the trek!

I agree that Ovoru is more likely to be in his mid-to-late 8Os – and I agree that his son Andy is a bit of an entrepeneur – but we should keep in mind they don’t have a welfare system in PNG and there are often long spells between trekker arrivals in their village – but so what!

‘Trouble is none of the neighbouring villages believes for a second that Ovoru is an Angel. The facts are hazy, they say: Ovoru was never on official lists of Angels; he was a scared boy who hid in the jungle; his real age is more like 80-something; his son Andy is milking the tourists’.

This is uninformed drivel!  I first met Ovoru 19 years ago when he wore just one medal – the PNG Independence Medal. I have also sighted the brown card he has which records his service as a wartime carrier. I’m sure he would have made this available to Kitchin if had asked.

‘A more practical clue comes from one older Efogi villager, who points out that Ovoru has no great-grandchildren. According to the rhythm of village life, if son Andy is 40 and has just started his family, it is inconceivable that Ovoru is old enough to have been an Angel. “Maybe his father, but definitely not Ovoru,” he says, sucking air through his teeth’.

More uninformed drivel! Ovoru Indiki has grandchildren attending the University of Papua New Guinea. I have met a number of them a number of times during my treks across the trail. They are proud of their grandfather and of the fact that his service as a wartime carrier has finally been acknowledged.

As a one-trek wonder, Kitchin would probably not be aware of the intense jealousies that exist between villages and between clans within villages. It is common knowledge that some of the older villagers from other clans are jealous of the attention Ovoru Indiki receives from trekkers because of his status as a village constable prior to independence, a luluai or chief of his clan and wartime carrier. It takes more than  a couple of treks to pick up on these nuances within and between village clans.

‘Apart from unconfirmed Angels, there are few obvious remnants from the war on the Track. A few three-man Japanese trenches and one-man Australian foxholes are dug into positions; one dump of rusted grenades, mortars and shells; one bullet jacket; one crashed American supply plane – and that’s about it.’

Kitchin either trekked with his eyes shut or didn’t venture off the easier eco-trail. I don’t know where he found the three-man Japanese trenches – the only ones I know of have individual firing bays connected with a communications trench. He obviously did not see the Australian delaying defensive position south of Eora Creek, the weapon pits to the east and west of Imita Gap, the US Army P40 kittyhawk at Myola, the Japanese Zero up from Isurava, etc, etc.

Kitchin’s criticism of the social conditions in PNG is not helped by trekkers who exploit local guides. By his own admission he and his sister used one guide and two porters for their 8 day trek.

To save weight ‘we leave behind tents and sleep in huts built from bush materials – these were leaky and completely exposed to mosquito attacks.’

His porters would have been burdened with packs of around 40-50 kg because they carried 8 days food for Kitchens and his partner – plus their own food and gear – together with cooking pots, machetes, camping gear, etc. They would not have been able to carry tents and Kitchin was obviously not prepared to pay for additional porters.

This type of exploitation of local porters should not be tolerated and it is pleasing to see that the Kokoda Track Authority has now recommended a maximum limit of 25 kg for each carrier.

It’s interesting that Kitchin and stayed at the Crowne Plaza at the end of his trek – one of the most expensive hotels in Papau New Guinea. I would hope he left his guide and porters with some cake!

REF : ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE KOKODA TRACK SPORTS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

I wish to thank you, your lovely wife and the Adventure Kokoda Management for financially supporting the Kokoda Track Sports Development Program within this year, 2009.

I had acknowledged your contribution to this very special project in various appropriate forums and have informed the boys and people along the Kokoda Track about your support.

In relation to the outcome of the Program, preparations are now underway by four (4) Local Rugby League Clubs in Queensland who are keen to engage few boys from the Kokoda Track to play in the local Queensland Rugby League Competition next year, 2010. Hopefully, the various Rugby Club offers (Work, Match payments, Accommodation) for the boys should be made available towards the end of January and I will make the announcements in the middle or towards the end of February, 2010.

Also the Gold Coast Titans Junior Development Team Management are keen to recruit school boys from the Kokoda Track area next year to be part of the Gold Coast Titans Junior Development Team under Football Scholarships. We will announce this program shortly.

Since you have pioneered in supporting this program, I trust you will continue to support this program.

I look forward to continue working with you in this very special Project in the New Year. Also I take this opportunity to wish you, your wife and your family a very Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, 2010

Yours sincerely,

Jame Enage
Chairman

PO Box 545
Boroko NCD 1 11
Papua New Guinea
P: (+675) 323 6165
F: (+675) 323 6020
E.:kokodatrackauthority@global.net.pg

Last year Adventure Kokoda was the only trekking company to pay our trek fees in full and in advance.  This year we were the only trekking company to respond to a call from the PNG Kokoda Track Authority to help sponsor a team of local rugby league players to train with the Gold Coast Titan Juniors on the Gold Coast. 

Following is a brief update on our philanthropic programs in PNG in 2009:

Kokoda Bursary Program – Port Moresby Grammar SchoolOur Adventure Kokoda partnership with the Port Moresby Grammar School continues to grow with the support of our trekkers. 

 This year we sponsored two students, Margaret Aitsi and Alfreda Nakue on the Kokoda Mateship Trek organised by two Federal MPs, Jason Clare and Scott Morrison.  Margaret and Alfreda graduated in December and were hosted by Adventure Kokoda for a 3-week trip to Sydney where they met up with their fellow trekkers in Bankstown and Cronulla.

We were delighted to receive the following email from Mr Don Daniels MBE, Chairman and Founder of the Port Moresby Grammar School on 10 October 2009:

Good morning Mr Lynn,

Years ago, we first met in the dining room of the Parliament of New South Wales when you invited Dame Carol Kidu and myself to a dinner.    The occasion then was about assisting Papua New Guinea students, especially those from villages along the Kokoda track.

Little did I know then, how much Port Moresby Grammar School is now in your debt for the support you have given the school.

Among other things, this support consists of:

1. four Adventure Kokoda bursaries
2. your kindness in sponsoring Margaret Aitsi and Alfreda Nakue on the trip of a lifetime to Australia
3. over 2500 books received for the library and classrooms
4. a plethora of stationery supplies
5. medical equipment and supplies
6. a wide variety of sports gear
7. K3500 in cash for special needs aspects in the school

Exposure of our students to wonderful ordinary Australians who come to PNG …. and reciprocally for Aussies to see and bond with Papua New Guineans within the school environment.

On behalf of the Board of Directors of the School, please accept our sincere and grateful thanks for that you have done and we hope this special bond between POM Grammar and Kokoda will continue and strengthen.

Sincerely,

DONALD DANIELS  MBE
Chairman and Founder
Port Moresby Grammar School

Kokoda Sports Development Program

Adventure Kokoda was proud to be the only trekking company to respond to a call to sponsor a Kokoda Trail Sports Development Program on the Gold Coast during the period 22 – 28 November 2009. 

The program comprised 17 rugby league players from villages along the Kokoda Trail and four officials.  The program was hosted by the Gold Coast Titans Junior Development Management Team and involved a number of training sessions with the Titans juniors.

A couple of league clubs in the local Queensland Rugby League were most impressed with the skills of the Kokoda players and have commenced negotiations to recruit some of the boys for next season.

Warren Bartlett of Sogeri Enterprises PNG joined Adventure Kokoda in sponsoring the Kokoda players. 

Kokoda Village School Support Program

Our sponsorship for the Kokoda Sports Development Program complements our ‘Yumi Helpim Pikinini’ Program where each of our trek groups is allocated a village to support with education, health and sporting supplies.  Under this program our trekkers are invited to bring items from a list we prepare to meet the needs of local villagers along the trail.  This year we have delivered 120 backpack loads of education, health and sporting supplies.  These are well received by the students who always respond with a special sing-sing for our groups.

In addition to this Adventure Kokoda provides ongoing support to Tessie Soi’s Friends Foundation and the Buk Bilong Pikinini and Kaikai Bilong Pikinini Programs established by Anne-Sophie Hermann, wife of the Australian High Commissioner to PNG, Mr Chris Moraitis.

These programs would not be possible without the active support of trekkers who choose to trek with Adventure Kokoda.  Their generosity is making a major difference to the lives of our Koiari and Orokaiva friends along the Kokoda Trail.

It was evident that the Kokoda Trail had been ignored by successive Australian Governments since the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

In 1992 I wrote a paper calling for the PNG Government to recognise the benefit of developing Kokoda as an adventure destination:

‘In the short term PNG should focus its tourist development on its natural assets – the country and its people. And it should develop policies to cater for the niche adventure market.

‘The Kokoda Trail is an ideal model. The trail has a special aura because of its significance in the war. The rugged beauty of the Owen Stanley Range and the nature and disposition of the villagers along the trail are unique attractions to the adventure tourist.

‘Tourism along the trail will create social and economic benefits for the villagers. Local guides will be employed, food will be procured, accommodation will be used, and artefacts will be purchased.

‘The 50th anniversary of the campaign across the Owen Stanley Range is a unique opportunity to refocus international attention to the challenge, the rigours, and the people of the Kokoda Trail. It provides an opportunity for the government of PNG to establish a model for adventure tourism which would otherwise take many years to establish’.

In 1994 I submitted a paper calling on our Federal government to seek to proclaim the Kokoda Trail as a National Memorial Park:

‘Any plan that is developed should consider the fact that PNG does not have a welfare system and the Koiari and Orokaiva people who live along the track operate a subsistence economy. They are also the custodians of the land on which the battles that saved Australia were fought.

‘If we develop our long term plan around providing a regular source of income for them we can be assured that they will protect and honour the battlesite we restore, the educational memorials we build and the village museums we assist with.

‘The objective of the master plan should therefore be to develop a self-sustaining eco-adventure trekking industry for the Koiari and Orokaiva people who live along the Kokoda Trail.’

It was difficult to progress the idea as the responsibility for such a plan did not fit neatly into a single Ministerial portfolio. I was advised by the Minister for Veterans Affairs that the government did not have a master plan for the development of the Kokoda track. With the concurrence of the Minister I volunteered to develop one.

I enlisted the support of Kelvin Templeton of Templeton-Galt who later engaged Dr Stephen Wearing of the University of Technology Sydney and Mr Paul Chatterton of the World Wide Fund for Nature in PNG to conduct workshops in Sydney, Port Moresby, Efogi village and Kokoda.

In 2003 my company, Adventure Kokoda Pty Limited, funded the establishment of the Kokoda Track Foundation to raise funds for the strategic plan and to develop shorter term educational, health and sporting initiatives for the Koiari and Orokaiva people along the track.

We then engaged Colonel David Knaggs of Davendish Consulting to facilitate workshops and write the plan.

I am indebted to the Directors of the Foundation, namely Kelvin Templeton, Yahoo Serious, Peter Thomas, Patrick Lindsay, Paul Croll, Genevieve Nelson, Dr Michael Cooper, Andrew Schauble, Brett Kirk, Gillian Marks, Sue Hoopman and Tony Stewart who were generous with their time and expertise. We were ably supported by our Secretary, Natalie Shymko; our Treasurer, Tiffany Couch; our Solicitor, David Frecker and our Auditor, John Flynn who provided their services in an honorary capacity.

I am also indebted to the Chief Executive Officer of the PNG Kokoda Track Authority, Mr. Warren Bartlett and his Board Members; representatives of the PNG National Government, Central and Oro Provincial Governments; Koiari and Kokoda Local Level Government authorities; and the clan leaders, landowners and other stakeholders along the track who hosted and participated in our workshops in PNG.

I wish to thank the RSL and Services Clubs Association, the Victorian Branch of the RSL, Johnson and Johnson, Templeton-Galt, WWF, the University of Technology Sydney and Adventure Kokoda for their corporate support. I also wish to thank the numerous individual donors who have ensured that village students will now have a better chance of obtaining a proper education and that villagers along the track will benefit from some of the medical supplies and sporting equipment we have delivered to them.

This is the first step in the process of having the Kokoda Trail proclaimed as a National Memorial Park and achieving a World Heritage Listing. I commend it to the Australian and PNG governments and urge them to use it as a reference document in the development of Kokoda and other significant Pacific War battlesite as the basis of a sustainable eco-tourism industry for PNG.

You can view the Strategic Plan we developed at http://www.kokodatreks.com/docs/StrategicPlanfortheKokodaTrailwithAttachments_000.pdf

Lest we forget,

Charlie Lynn